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Abstract. Aiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term convergence
properties, we derive a second-order inertial system that builds on the widely studied “heavy ball with
friction” optimization method. By exploiting a well-known link between the replicator dynamics and
the Shahshahani geometry on the space of mixed strategies, the dynamics are stated in a Riemannian
geometric framework where trajectories are accelerated by the players’ unilateral payoﬀ gradients and
they slow down near Nash equilibria. Surprisingly (and in stark contrast to another second-order
variant of the replicator dynamics), the inertial replicator dynamics are not well-posed; on the other
hand, it is possible to obtain a well-posed system by endowing the mixed strategy space with a
diﬀerent Hessian–Riemannian (HR) metric structure, and we characterize those HR geometries that
do so. In the single-agent version of the dynamics (corresponding to constrained optimization over
simplex-like objects), we show that regular maximum points of smooth functions attract all nearby
solution orbits with low initial speed. More generally, we establish an inertial variant of the so-
called folk theorem of evolutionary game theory, and we show that strict equilibria are attracting
in asymmetric (multipopulation) games, provided, of course, that the dynamics are well-posed. A
similar asymptotic stability result is obtained for evolutionarily stable states in symmetric (single-
population) games.
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1. Introduction. One of the most widely studied dynamics for learning and
evolution in games is the classical replicator equation of Taylor and Jonker [47], ﬁrst
introduced as a model of population evolution under natural selection. Stated in the
context of ﬁnite N -player games with each player k ∈ {1, . . . , N} choosing an action
from a ﬁnite set Ak, these dynamics take the form
(RD) x˙kα = xkα
[
vkα(x) −
∑
β∈Ak
xkβvkβ(x)
]
,
where xk = (xkα)α∈Ak denotes the mixed strategy of player k (i.e., xkα represents the
probability with which player k selects α ∈ Ak), while vkα(x) denotes the expected
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3142 RIDA LARAKI AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
payoﬀ to action α ∈ Ak in the mixed strategy proﬁle x = (x1, . . . , xN ).1
Accordingly, a considerable part of the literature has focused on the long-term
rationality properties of the replicator dynamics. First, building on early work by Akin
[2] and Nachbar [32], Samuelson and Zhang [39] showed that suboptimal, dominated
strategies become extinct along every interior trajectory of (RD). Second, the so-
called folk theorem of evolutionary game theory states that (a) Nash equilibria are
stationary in (RD); (b) limit points of interior trajectories are Nash; and (c) strict
Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable under (RD) [19, 20]. Finally, when the game
admits a potential function (in the sense of [31]), interior trajectories of (RD) converge
to the set of Nash equilibria that are local potential maximizers [19].
To a large extent, the strong convergence properties of the replicator dynamics
are owed to their dual nature as a reinforcement learning/unilateral optimization
device. The former aspect is provided by the link between (RD) and the so-called
exponential weights (EW) algorithm where players choose an action with probability
that is exponentially proportional to its cumulative payoﬀ over time [24, 29, 37, 45, 49].
In continuous time, this process formally amounts to the dynamical system
(EW)
y˙kα = vkα,
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑
β exp(ykβ)
,
and, as can be seen by a simple diﬀerentiation, (EW) is equivalent to (RD).
Dually, from an optimization perspective, the replicator dynamics can also be seen
as a unilateral gradient ascent scheme where, to maximize their individual payoﬀs,
players ascend the (unilateral) gradient of their payoﬀ functions with respect to a
particular geometry on the simplex—the so-called Shahshahani metric, given by the
metric tensor gαβ(x) = δαβ/xα for xα > 0 [42]. In this light, (RD) can be recast as
(1.1) x˙k = grad
S
k uk(x),
where gradSk uk(x) denotes the unilateral Shahshahani gradient of the expected payoﬀ
function uk(x) =
∑
α xkαvkα(x) of player k [1, 17, 18, 42].
2 Owing to this last
interpretation, (RD) becomes a proper Shahshahani gradient ascent scheme in the
class of potential games: the game’s potential acts as a Lyapunov function for (RD),
so interior trajectories converge to the set of Nash equilibria that are local maximizers
thereof [18, 19].3
Despite these important properties, the replicator dynamics fail to eliminate
weakly dominated strategies [38]. Thus, motivated by the success of second-order,
“heavy ball with friction” methods in optimization [3, 4, 6, 8, 16, 35], our ﬁrst goal in
this paper is to examine whether it is possible to obtain better convergence properties
1In the mass-action interpretation of population games, xkα represents the proportion of players
in population k that use strategy α ∈ Ak, and vkα(x) is the associated ﬁtness.
2For our purposes, “unilateral” here means diﬀerentiation with respect to the variables that are
directly under the player’s control (as opposed to all variables, including other players’ strategies).
3By contrast, using ordinary Euclidean gradients and projections leads to the well-known (Eu-
clidean) projection dynamics of Friedman [15]; however, because Euclidean trajectories may collide
with the boundary of the game’s state space in ﬁnite time, the folk theorem of evolutionary game
theory does not hold in a Euclidean context, even when the game is a potential one [41].
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INERTIAL GAME DYNAMICS 3143
in a second-order setting. To that end, if we replace y˙ by y¨ in (EW), we obtain the
dynamics
(EW2)
y¨kα = vkα,
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑
β exp(ykβ)
.
These second-order exponential learning dynamics were studied in the very recent
paper [21], where it was shown that (EW2) is equivalent to the second-order replicator
equation4
(RD2)
x¨kα = xkα
⎡
⎣vkα(x)− ∑
β∈Ak
xkβvkβ(x)
⎤
⎦
+ xkα
⎡
⎣x˙2kα/x2kα − ∑
β∈Ak
x˙2kβ
/
xkβ
⎤
⎦ .
Importantly, under (EW2)/(RD2), even weakly dominated strategies become extinct;
such strategies may survive in perpetuity under the ﬁrst-order dynamics (RD), so this
represents a marked advantage for using second-order methods in games.
That being said, the second-order system (RD2) has no obvious ties to the gradient
ascent properties of its ﬁrst-order counterpart, so it is not clear whether its trajectories
converge to Nash equilibrium in potential games. On that account, a natural way to
regain this connection would be to see whether (RD2) can be linked to the heavy ball
with friction system
(1.2)
D2xk
Dt2
= gradSk uk(x)− ηx˙k,
where D
2xk
Dt2 denotes the covariant acceleration of xk under the Shahshahani metric
and η ≥ 0 is a friction coeﬃcient, included in (1.2) to slow down trajectories and
enable convergence. In this way, if the game admits a potential function Φ, the total
energy E(x, x˙) = 12 ‖x˙‖2 − Φ(x) will be Lyapunov under (1.2) (by construction), so
4From the point of view of evolutionary game theory, there is an alternative derivation of the
second-order replicator dynamics (RD2) which is based on the so-called imitation of long-term suc-
cess [21]. Focusing for simplicity on a single population, assume that each nonatomic agent in the
population receives an opportunity to switch strategies at every ring of a Poisson alarm clock and
ραβ denotes the corresponding switch rate from strategy α to strategy β [41]. Then, the population’s
evolution over time will be governed by the mean dynamics
(MD) x˙α =
∑
β
xβρβα − xα
∑
β
ραβ .
In this context, the well-known “imitation of success” revision protocol [50, 41] is described by the
rule ραβ = xβvβ(x), which implies that α-strategists switch to β in proportion to how often they
encounter a β-strategist (the xβ term in ραβ) and how high the payoﬀ to a β-strategist is (the
imitation of success part). On the other hand, if agents base their decisions on the long-term success
of the agents that they observe, we instead obtain the revision rule ραβ = xβ
∫ t
0
v(x(s)) ds. In this
case, (MD) becomes an integro-diﬀerential equation which can be shown to be equivalent to (RD2)
[21]. For a control-theoretic approach to second-order methods in games (with constraints on the
velocity and focusing on stable policies), see [7] and references therein.
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3144 RIDA LARAKI AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
(1.2) is intuitively expected to converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game that
are local maximizers of Φ.
Writing everything out in components (see section 2 for detailed deﬁnitions and
derivations), we obtain the inertial replicator dynamics5
(IRD)
x¨kα = xkα
⎡
⎣vkα(x) − ∑
β∈Ak
xkβvkβ(x)
⎤
⎦
+
1
2
xkα
⎡
⎣ x˙2kα
x2kα
−
∑
β∈Ak
x˙2kβ
xkβ
⎤
⎦− ηx˙kα,
with the “inertial” velocity-dependent term of (IRD) stemming from covariant diﬀer-
entiation under the Shahshahani metric. Rather surprisingly (and in stark contrast
to the ﬁrst-order case), we see that (EW2) and (1.2) lead to dynamics that are similar
but not identical: in the baseline, frictionless case (η = 0), (RD2) and (IRD) diﬀer by
a factor of 1/2 in their velocity-dependent terms. Further, in an even more surprising
twist, this seemingly innocuous factor actually leads to drastic diﬀerences: solutions
to (IRD) typically fail to exist for all time, so the asymptotic properties of the ﬁrst-
and second-order replicator dynamics do not (in fact, cannot) extend to (IRD).
The reason that (IRD) fails to be well-posed is deeply geometric and has to do
with the fact that the Shahshahani simplex is isometric to an orthant of the Euclidean
sphere (a bounded set that cannot restrain second-order heavy ball trajectories). On
that account, the second main goal of our paper is to examine whether the heavy
ball with friction optimization principle that underlies (1.2) can lead to a well-posed
system with good convergence properties under a diﬀerent choice of geometry.
To that end, we focus on the class of Hessian–Riemannian (HR) metrics [13, 44]
that have been studied extensively in the context of convex programming [5, 11]; in
fact, the proposed class of dynamics provides a second-order, inertial extension of
the gradient-like dynamics of [11] to a game-theoretic setting with several agents,
each seeking to maximize their individual payoﬀ function. The reason for focusing on
the class of HR metrics is that they are generated by taking the Hessian of a steep,
strongly convex function over the problem’s state space (a simplex-like object in our
case), so, thanks to the geometry’s “steepness” at the boundary of the feasible region,
the induced ﬁrst-order gradient ﬂows are well-posed. Of course, as the Shahshahani
case shows,6 this “steepness” is not enough to guarantee well-posedness in a second-
order setting; however, if the geometry is “steep enough” (in a certain, precise sense),
the resulting dynamics are well-posed and exhibit a fair set of long-term convergence
properties (including convergence to equilibrium in the class of potential games).
We should reiterate at this point that our game-theoretic motivation is not “be-
havioral” but “target-driven.” In particular, we do not purport to model the behavior
of human agents that are involved in repeated game-like interactions—such as one’s
choice of itinerary on one’s way to work. Instead, our motivation stems from the
applications of game theory to controlled systems and engineering: there, the goal is
to devise a dynamical process that can be embedded in each controllable entity of a
large, complex system (such as a processing unit of a parallel computing grid or a
5We are grateful to Je´roˆme Bolte for suggesting the term “inertial.”
6In a certain sense, the Shahshahani metric (and the induced replicator dynamics) is the archety-
pal HR metric, obtained by taking the Hessian of the Gibbs negative entropy.
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INERTIAL GAME DYNAMICS 3145
wireless device in a cellular network), with the aim of steering the system to a target,
equilibrium state.7
In this context, any single-agent sequential optimization scheme with strong con-
vergence properties is a good candidate to be implemented as a multiagent learning
method. Thus, given that the inertial dynamics (IRD) represent a fusion of HR meth-
ods [11, 5] with the second-order approach of [21], one would optimistically hope that
(IRD) exhibits their combined properties. Our analysis in this paper aims to examine
whether this expectation is a realistic one.
1.1. Paper outline and summary of results. The breakdown of our analysis
is as follows: in section 2, we present an explicit derivation of the class of inertial
game dynamics under study, and we discuss their “energy minimization” properties
in the class of potential games. Our asymptotic analysis begins in section 3, where we
discuss the well-posedness problems that arise in the case of the replicator dynamics
and we derive a geometric characterization of the HR structures that lead to a well-
posed ﬂow: as it turns out, global solutions exist if and only if the interior of the
game’s strategy space can be mapped isometrically to a closed (but not compact)
hypersurface of some ambient Euclidean space.
Our convergence results are presented in section 4. First, from an optimization
viewpoint, we show that isolated maximizers of smooth functions deﬁned on simplex-
like objects are asymptotically stable; as a result, Nash equilibria that are potential
maximizers are asymptotically stable in potential games. More generally, we establish
the following folk theorem for N -player games: (a) Nash equilibria are stationary;
(b) if an interior orbit converges, its limit is a restricted equilibrium; and (c) strict
equilibria attract all nearby trajectories. Finally, in the framework of doubly symmet-
ric games, we show that evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) are asymptotically stable,
providing in this way an extension of the corresponding result for the symmetric
replicator dynamics [19]; by contrast, this result does not hold under the second-
order replicator dynamics (RD2). For completeness, some elements of Riemannian
geometry are discussed in Appendix A (mostly to ﬁx terminology and notation); ﬁ-
nally, to streamline the ﬂow of ideas in the paper, some proofs and calculations have
been relegated to Appendix B.
1.2. Notational conventions. If W is a vector space, we will write W ∗ for its
dual and 〈ω|w〉 for the pairing between the primal vector w ∈ W and the dual vector
ω ∈ W ∗. By contrast, an inner product on W will be denoted by 〈·, ·〉, writing, e.g.,
〈w,w′〉 for the product between the (primal) vectors w,w′ ∈ W .
The real space spanned by the ﬁnite set S = {sα}nα=0 will be denoted by RS , and
we will write {es}s∈S for its canonical basis. In a slight abuse of notation, we will
also use α to refer interchangeably to either sα or eα, and we will write δαβ for the
Kronecker delta symbols on S. The set Δ(S) of probability measures on S will be
identiﬁed with the n-dimensional simplex Δ = {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0}
of RS , and the relative interior of Δ will be denoted by Δ◦. Finally, if {Sk}k∈N
is a ﬁnite family of ﬁnite sets, we will use the shorthand (αk;α−k) for the tuple
(. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ); also, when there is no danger of confusion, we will write∑k
α instead of
∑
α∈Sk .
7A discrete-time, algorithmic equivalent of the dynamics presented in this paper can also be
examined via the stochastic approximation machinery of [10]. However, this analysis would take us
far beyond the scope of the current paper so we delegate it to future work.
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3146 RIDA LARAKI AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
1.3. Deﬁnitions from game theory. A ﬁnite game in normal form is a tuple
G ≡ G(N ,A, u) consisting of (a) a ﬁnite set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; (b) a ﬁnite
set Ak of actions (or pure strategies) per player k ∈ N ; and (c) the players’ payoﬀ
functions uk : A → R, where A ≡
∏
k Ak denotes the set of all joint action proﬁles
(α1, . . . , αN ). The set of mixed strategies of player k will be denoted by Xk ≡ Δ(Ak),
and we will write X ≡∏k Xk for the game’s state space, i.e., the space ofmixed strategy
proﬁles x = (x1, . . . , xN ). Unless mentioned otherwise, we will write Vk ≡ RAk and
V ≡∏k Vk ∼= R∐k Ak for the ambient spaces of Xk and X , respectively.
The expected payoﬀ of player k in the strategy proﬁle x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X is
(1.3) uk(x) =
∑
α1
· · ·
∑
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · xN,αN ,
where uk(α1, . . . , αN ) denotes the payoﬀ of player k in the pure proﬁle (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈
A. Accordingly, the payoﬀ corresponding to α ∈ Ak in the mixed proﬁle x ∈ X is
vkα(x) =
∑
α1
· · ·
∑
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · δαk,α · · · xN,αN ,(1.4)
and we have
(1.5) uk(x) =
∑
α
xkαvkα(x) = 〈vk(x)|xk〉 ,
where vk(x) = (vkα(x))α∈Ak denotes the payoﬀ vector of player k at x ∈ X .
In the above, vk is treated as a dual vector in V
∗
k that is paired to the mixed
strategy xk ∈ Xk; on that account, mixed strategies will be regarded throughout this
paper as primal variables and payoﬀ vectors as duals. Moreover, note that vkα(x)
does not depend on xkα so we have vkα =
∂uk
∂xkα
; in view of this, we will often refer
to vkα as the marginal utility of action α ∈ Ak, and we will identify vk(x) ∈ V ∗ with
the (unilateral) diﬀerential of uk(x) with respect to xk.
Finally, following [31, 40], we will say that G is a potential game when it admits
a potential function Φ: X → R such that
(1.6) vkα(x) =
∂Φ
∂xkα
for all x ∈ X and for all α ∈ Ak, k ∈ N ,
or, equivalently,
(1.7) uk(xk;x−k)− uk(x′k;x−k) = Φ(xk;x−k)− Φ(x′k;x−k)
for all xk ∈ Xk and for all x−k ∈ X−k ≡
∏
 =k X, k ∈ N .
2. Inertial game dynamics. In this section, we introduce the class of inertial
game dynamics that comprises the main focus of our paper. For notational simplicity,
most of our derivations are presented in the case of a single player with a ﬁnite action
set A = {0, . . . , n}; the extension to the general, multiplayer case is straightforward
and simply involves reinstating the player index k where necessary.
As we explained in the introduction, the dynamics under study in this unilateral
framework boil down to the heavy ball with friction system
(HBF)
D2x
Dt2
= gradu(x)− ηx˙,
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INERTIAL GAME DYNAMICS 3147
where gradients and covariant derivatives are taken with respect to a Riemannian
metric g on the game’s state space X ≡ Δ(A); for a brief discussion of the necessary
concepts from Riemannian geometry, the reader is referred to Appendix A. Of course,
in the ordinary Euclidean case (where covariant and ordinary derivatives coincide),
there is no barrier term in (HBF) that can constrain the dynamics’ solution trajecto-
ries to remain in X for all time; as such, we begin by presenting a class of Riemannian
metrics with a more appropriate boundary behavior.
2.1. Hessian–Riemannian metrics. Following Bolte and Teboulle [11] and
Alvarez, Bolte, and Brahic [5], we begin by endowing the positive orthant C ≡ RA++ ≡
{x ∈ RA : xα > 0} of the ambient space V = RA of X with a Riemannian metric g(x)
that blows up at the boundary hyperplanes xα = 0—raising in this way an inherent
geometric barrier on the boundary bd(X ) of X .
A standard device to achieve this blow-up is to deﬁne g(x) as the Hessian of a
strongly convex function h : C → R that becomes inﬁnitely steep at the boundary of
C [5, 11, 30, 43]. To that end, let θ : [0,+∞) → R∪ {+∞} be a C∞-smooth function
satisfying the Legendre-type properties [5, 11, 36]8
(L)
1. θ(x) < ∞ for all x > 0;
2. limx→0+ θ′(x) = −∞;
3. θ′′(x) > 0 and θ′′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0.
We then deﬁne the associated penalty function
(2.1) h(x) =
n∑
α=0
θ(xα),
and we deﬁne a metric g on C by taking the Hessian of h, viz.,
(2.2) gαβ =
∂2h
∂xα∂xβ
= θ′′αδαβ ,
where the shorthand θ′′α, α = 0, . . . , n, stands for θ′′(xα). In other words, the HR
metric induced by θ is the ﬁeld of positive-deﬁnite matrices
(2.3) g(x) = diag(θ′′(x0), . . . , θ′′(xn)), x ∈ C.
With h strictly convex (recall that θ′′ > 0), it follows that g is indeed a Riemannian
metric tensor on C; following [5], we will refer to θ as the kernel of g.
Remark 2.1. The penalty function h of (2.1) is closely related to the class of
control cost functions used to deﬁne quantal responses in the theory of discrete choice
[28, 48] and the class of regularizer functions used in mirror descent methods for
optimization and online learning [30, 33, 34, 43]; for a detailed discussion, we refer
the reader to [5, 11, 12]. In fact, more general HR structures can be obtained by
considering C2-smooth strongly convex functions h : C → R that do not necessarily
admit a decomposition of the form (2.1). Most of our results can be extended to this
nonseparable setting, but the calculations involved are signiﬁcantly more tedious, so
we will focus on the simpler, decomposable framework of (2.1).9
Example 2.1 (the Shahshahani metric). The most widely studied example of
a non-Euclidean HR structure on the simplex is generated by the entropic kernel
8Legendre-type functions are usually deﬁned without the regularity requirement θ′′′ < 0. This
assumption can be relaxed without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting our results, but we will keep it for simplicity.
9In particular, the results that do not hold verbatim are those that call explicitly on θ—most
notably, Corollary 3.6.
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θS(x) = x log x. By diﬀerentiation, we then obtain the Shahshahani metric [1, 5, 42]
(2.4) gS(x) = diag(1/x0, . . . , 1/xn), x ∈ C,
or, in coordinates,
(2.5) gSαβ(x) = δαβ/xβ.
Example 2.2 (the log-barrier). Another important example with close ties to
proximal barrier methods in optimization (see, e.g., [5, 11] and references therein) is
given by the logarithmic barrier kernel θL(x) = − log x [5, 9, 14, 27]. The associated
penalty function is h(x) = −∑α log xα, and its Hessian generates the metric
(2.6) gLαβ(x) = δαβ/x
2
β,
or, in matrix form,
(2.7) gL(x) = diag(1/x20, . . . , 1/x
2
n), x ∈ C.
An important qualitative diﬀerence between the kernels θS and θL is that the former
remains bounded as x → 0+, whereas the latter blows up; this diﬀerence will play a
key role with regard to the existence of global solutions.
2.2. Derivation of the dynamics and examples. Having endowed C with
an HR structure g with kernel θ, we continue with the calculation of the gradient
and acceleration terms of (HBF). To that end, it will be convenient to introduce the
coordinate transformation
(2.8) π0 : (x0, x1, . . . , xn) → (x1, . . . , xn),
which maps the aﬃne hull of X isomorphically to V0 ≡ Rn by eliminating x0. The
(right) inverse of this transformation is given by the injection
(2.9) ι0 : (x1, . . . , xn) →
(
1−
n∑
α=1
xα, x1, . . . , xn
)
,
so (2.8) provides a global coordinate chart for X that will allow us to carry out the
necessary geometric calculations.
As a ﬁrst step, let {eα}nα=0 and {e˜μ}nμ=1 denote the canonical bases of V and
V0, respectively. Then, under ι0, e˜μ is pushed forward to (ι0)∗e˜μ = eμ − e0,10 so the
componentwise expression of g in the coordinates (2.8) is
(2.10) g˜μν = 〈eμ − e0, eν − e0〉 = gμν + g00 = θ′′μδμν + θ′′0 .
With this coordinate expression at hand, let f : X ◦ → R be a (smooth) function on
X ◦, and write f˜ = f ◦ ι0, (x1, . . . , xn) → f(1 −
∑n
α=1, x1, . . . , xn) for its coordi-
nate expression under (2.9). Referring to Appendix A for the required background
deﬁnitions,11 the gradient of f with respect to g may be expressed as
(2.11) gradf = g−1 · ∇f =
n∑
μ,ν=1
g˜μν
∂f˜
∂xν
e˜μ,
10Simply note that the image of the coordinate curve γμ(t) = te˜μ under ι0 is −te0 + teμ.
11We only mention here that grad f is characterized by the chain rule property d
dt
f(x(t)) =
〈x˙(t), grad f(x(t))〉 for every smooth curve x(t) on X ◦.
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where g˜μν is the inverse matrix of g˜μν . By the inversion formula of Lemma B.1, we
then obtain
(2.12) g˜μν =
δμν
θ′′μ
− Θ
′′
θ′′μθ′′ν
,
where Θ′′ =
(∑
β 1/θ
′′
β
)−1
denotes the “harmonic sum” of the metric weights θ′′β .
12
Thus, by carrying out the summation in (2.11), we get the coordinate expression
(2.13) grad f =
n∑
μ=1
1
θ′′μ
[
∂f˜
∂xμ
−Θ′′
n∑
ν=1
1
θ′′ν
∂f˜
∂xν
]
e˜μ.
Accordingly, if the domain of f : X ◦ → R extends to an open neighborhood of X ◦ (so
∂μf˜ = ∂μf − ∂0f for all x ∈ X ◦), some algebra readily gives
(2.14) grad f =
n∑
α=0
1
θ′′α
[
∂f
∂xα
−Θ′′
n∑
β=0
1
θ′′β
∂f
∂xβ
]
eα.
With regard to the inertial acceleration term of (HBF), taking the covariant
derivative of x˙ in the coordinate frame (2.8) yields
(2.15)
D2xμ
Dt2
= x¨μ +
n∑
ν,ρ=1
Γ˜μνρx˙ν x˙ρ, μ = 1, . . . , n,
where the so-called Christoﬀel symbols Γ˜μνρ of g are given by
13
(2.16) Γ˜μνρ =
1
2
n∑
κ=1
g˜μκ
(
∂g˜κν
∂xρ
+
∂g˜ρκ
∂xν
− ∂g˜νρ
∂xκ
)
.
After a somewhat cumbersome calculation (cf. Appendix B), we then get
(2.17)
D2xμ
Dt2
= x¨μ +
1
2
θ′′′μ
θ′′μ
x˙2μ −
1
2
Θ′′
θ′′μ
⎡
⎣ n∑
ν=1
θ′′′ν
θ′′ν
x˙2ν +
θ′′′0
θ′′0
(
n∑
ν=1
x˙ν
)2⎤⎦ ,
so, with x˙0 = −
∑n
ν=1 x˙ν , (2.15) becomes
(2.18)
D2xα
Dt2
= x¨α +
1
2
1
θ′′α
[
θ′′′α x˙
2
α −Θ′′
n∑
β=0
θ′′′β x˙
2
β
θ′′β
]
.
In view of the above, putting together (2.14), (2.18), and (HBF), we obtain the
inertial game dynamics
(ID)
x¨kα =
1
θ′′kα
[
vkα −Θ′′k
∑
β
vkβ
θ′′kβ
]
− 1
2
1
θ′′kα
[
θ′′′kαx˙
2
kα −Θ′′k
∑
β
θ′′′kβ x˙
2
kβ
θ′′kβ
]
− ηx˙kα,
12Note that Θ′′ is not a second derivative; we are only using this notation for visual consistency.
13For a more detailed discussion the reader is again referred to Appendix A. We only mention here
that the covariant derivative in (2.15) is deﬁned so that the system’s energy E(x, x˙) = 1
2
‖x˙‖2−u(x)
is a constant of motion under (HBF) when η = 0 (and Lyapunov when η > 0).
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where, in obvious notation, we have reinstated the player index k and we have used
the fact that vkα =
∂uk
∂xkα
. Since these dynamics comprise the main focus of our paper,
we immediately proceed to two representative examples.
Example 2.3 (the inertial replicator dynamics). The Shahshahani kernel θ(x) =
x log x has θ′′(x) = 1/x and θ′′′(x) = −1/x2, so (ID) leads to the inertial replicator
dynamics
(IRD) x¨kα = xkα
[
vkα −
∑
β
xkβvkβ
]
+
1
2
xkα
[
x˙2kα
x2kα
−
∑
β
x˙2kβ
xkβ
]
− ηx˙kα.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the only notable diﬀerence between (IRD) and
the second-order replicator dynamics of exponential learning (RD2) is the factor 1/2
in the right-hand side (RHS) of (IRD) (the friction term ηx˙ is not important for this
comparison). Despite the innocuous character of this scaling-like factor,14 we shall see
in the following section that (IRD) and (RD2) behave in drastically diﬀerent ways.
Example 2.4 (the inertial log-barrier dynamics). The log-barrier kernel θ(x) =
− logx has θ′′(x) = 1/x2 and θ′′′(x) = −2/x3, so we obtain the inertial log-barrier
dynamics
(ILD) x¨kα = x
2
kα
[
vkα − r−2k
∑
β
x2kβvkβ
]
+ x2kα
[
x˙2kα
x3kα
− r−2k
∑
β
x˙2kβ
xkβ
]
− ηx˙kα,
where r2k =
∑k
β x
2
kβ . The ﬁrst-order analogue of these dynamics—namely, the system
x˙kα = x
2
kα(vkα − r−2k
∑
kβ x
2
kβvkβ)—has been studied extensively in the context of
linear programming and convex optimization [5, 9, 11, 14, 27], while its game-theoretic
properties are discussed in [30].
3. Basic properties and well-posedness. In this section, we examine the
energy dissipation and well-posedness properties of (ID). For convenience, we will
work with the single-agent version of the dynamics (ID) with v = ∇Φ for some
Lipschitz continuous and suﬃciently smooth function Φ on X .15
3.1. Friction and dissipation of energy. We begin by showing that the sys-
tem’s total energy
(3.1) E(x, x˙) =
1
2
‖x˙‖2 − Φ(x)
is dissipated along the inertial dynamics (ID) for η > 0 (or is a constant of motion in
the frictionless case η = 0).
Proposition 3.1. The total energy E(x, x˙) is nonincreasing along any interior
solution orbit of (ID); speciﬁcally,
(3.2) E˙ = −2ηK = −η ‖x˙‖2 ,
where K = 12 ‖x˙‖2 is the system’s kinetic energy.
14It is tempting to interpret the factor 1/2 in (IRD) as a change of time with respect to (RD2),
but the presence of x˙2 precludes as much.
15Here and in what follows, it will be convenient to assume that Φ is deﬁned on an open neigh-
borhood of X . This assumption facilitates the use of standard coordinates for calculations, but none
of our results depend on this device.
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Proof. By diﬀerentiating (3.1) along x˙(t), we readily obtain
E˙ = ∇x˙E = 1
2
∇x˙ 〈x˙, x˙〉 − ∇x˙Φ = 〈∇x˙x˙, x˙〉 − 〈dΦ|x˙〉
=
〈
D2x
Dt2
, x˙
〉
− 〈gradΦ, x˙〉 = 〈gradΦ− ηx˙, x˙〉 − 〈gradΦ, x˙〉
= −η 〈x˙, x˙〉 = −2ηK,(3.3)
where we used the metric compatibility (A.12) of ∇ in the ﬁrst line and the deﬁnition
of the dynamics (ID) in the second.
Proposition 3.1 shows that, for η > 0, the system’s total energy E = K − Φ is
a Lyapunov function for (ID); by contrast, in ﬁrst-order HR gradient ﬂows [5, 11], it
is the maximization objective Φ that acts as a Lyapunov function. As such, in the
second-order context of (ID), it will be important to show that the system’s kinetic
energy eventually vanishes—so that Φ becomes an “asymptotic” Lyapunov function.
To that end, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let x(t) be a solution trajectory of (ID) that is deﬁned for all
t ≥ 0. If η > 0, then limt→∞ x˙(t) = 0.
To prove Proposition 3.2, we will require the following intermediate result.
Lemma 3.3. Let x(t) be an interior solution of (ID) that is deﬁned for all t ≥ 0.
If η > 0, the rate of change of the system’s kinetic energy is bounded from above for
all t ≥ 0.
Proof. By diﬀerentiating K with respect to time, we readily obtain
K˙ = ∇x˙K =
〈
D2x
Dt2
, x˙
〉
= 〈gradΦ− ηx˙, x˙〉
= 〈dΦ|x˙〉 − η ‖x˙‖2 =
∑
β
∂Φ
∂xβ
x˙β − η
∑
β
θ′′β x˙
2
β
≤ A
∑
β
|x˙β | − ηB
∑
β
x˙2β ,(3.4)
where A = sup |∂βΦ| < ∞ and B = inf{θ′′(x) : x ∈ (0, 1)}. With A ﬁnite and
B > 0 (on account of the Legendre properties of θ), the maximum value of the above
expression is (n+ 1)A2/(4ηB), so K˙ is bounded from above.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let E(t) = 12 ‖x˙(t)‖2 − Φ(x(t)) be the system’s energy
at time t. Proposition 3.1 shows that E˙ = −η ‖x˙‖2 = −2ηK ≤ 0, so E(t) decreases to
some value E∗ ∈ R; as a result, we also get ∫∞0 K(s) ds = (2η)−1 (E(0)− E∗) < ∞.
This suggests that limt→∞ K(t) = 0, but since there exist positive integrable functions
which do not converge to 0 as t → ∞, our assertion does not yet follow.
Assume therefore that lim supt→∞K(t) = 3ε > 0. In that case, there exists by
continuity an increasing sequence of times tn → ∞ such that K(tn) > 2ε for all
n. Accordingly, let sn = sup{t : t ≤ tn and K(t) < ε}: since K is integrable and
nonnegative, we also have sn → ∞ (because lim infK(t) = 0), so, by descending to a
subsequence of tn, we may assume without loss of generality that sn+1 > tn for all n.
Hence, if we let Jn = [sn, tn], we have
(3.5)
∫ ∞
0
K(s) ds ≥
∞∑
n=1
∫
Jn
K ≥ ε
∞∑
n=1
|Jn|,
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which shows that the Lebesgue measure |Jn| of Jn vanishes as t → ∞. Consequently,
by the mean value theorem, it follows that there exists ξn ∈ (sn, tn) such that
(3.6) K˙(ξn) =
K(tn)−K(sn)
|Jn| >
ε
|Jn| ,
and since |Jn| → 0, we conclude that lim sup K˙(t) = ∞. This contradicts the conclu-
sion of Lemma 3.3, so we get K(t) → 0 and x˙(t) → 0.
Remark 3.1. The proof technique above easily extends to the Euclidean case,
thus providing an alternative proof of the velocity integrability and convergence part
of Theorem 2.1 in [3]; furthermore, if we consider a Hessian-driven damping term in
(ID) as in [4], the estimate (3.4) remains essentially unchanged, and our approach
may also be used to prove the corresponding claim of Theorem 2.1 in [4].
3.2. Well-posedness and Euclidean coordinates. Clearly, Proposition 3.2
applies if and only if the trajectory in question exists for all time, so it is crucial
to determine whether the dynamics (ID) are well-posed. To that end, we will begin
with the inertial replicator dynamics (IRD) in the simple, baseline case X = [0, 1],
Φ = 0, which corresponds to a single player with two twin actions—say A = {0, 1}
with v0 = v1 = 0. Setting x = x1 = 1 − x0 in (IRD), we then get the second-order
ODE
(3.7) x¨ =
1
2
x
(
x˙
x2
− x˙
2
x
− x˙
2
(1 − x)
)
=
1
2
1− 2x
x(1− x) x˙
2.
To solve this equation, let ξ = 2
√
x and υ = ξ˙; after some algebra, we obtain the
separable equation
(3.8)
dυ
υ
= − ξ
4− ξ2 dξ,
which, after integrating, further reduces to
(3.9) ξ˙ = υ =
υ0
4− ξ20
√
4− ξ2,
with ξ0 = ξ(0) and υ0 = υ(0) = ξ˙(0). Some more algebra then yields the solution
(3.10) ξ(t) = ξ0 cos
υ0t√
4− ξ20
+
√
4− ξ20 sin
υ0t√
4− ξ20
.
From the above, we see that ξ(t) becomes negative in ﬁnite time for every interior
initial position ξ0 ∈ (0, 2) and for all υ0 ∈ R. However, since ξ(t) = 2
√
x(t) by
deﬁnition, this can occur only if x(t) exits (0, 1) in ﬁnite time; as a result, we conclude
that the inertial replicator dynamics (IRD) may fail to be well-posed, even in the
simple case of the zero game.
On the other hand, a similar calculation for the inertial log-barrier dynamics
(ILD) yields the equation
(3.11) x¨ = x˙2
(1− 2x)(1− x+ x2)
x(1 − x)(1 − 2x+ 2x2) ,
which, after the change of variables ξ = log x < 0 (recall that 0 < x < 1), becomes
(3.12) ξ¨ = −ξ˙2 e
2ξ
(1− eξ)(e2ξ + (1− eξ)2) .
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Setting υ = ξ˙ and separating as before, we then obtain the equation
(3.13) ξ˙ = C
1− eξ√
1− 2eξ + 2e2ξ ,
where C ∈ R is an integration constant. Contrary to (3.13), the RHS of (3.13) is
Lipschitz and bounded for ξ < 0 (and vanishes at ξ = 0), so the solution ξ(t) exists
for all time; as a result, we conclude that the simple system (3.11) is well-posed.
The fundamental diﬀerence between (3.7) and (3.11) is that the image of (0, 1)
under the change of variables x → 2√x is a bounded set, whereas the image of
the transformation x → log x is the (unbounded) half-line ξ < 0: consequently, the
solutions of (3.9) escape from the image of (0, 1) in ﬁnite time, whereas the solutions
of (3.13) remain contained therein for all t ≥ 0. As we show below, this is a special
case of a more general geometric principle which characterizes those HR structures
that lead to well-posed dynamics.
Our ﬁrst step will be to construct a Euclidean equivalent of the dynamics (IRD)
by mapping X ◦ isometrically in an ambient Euclidean space. To that end, let g be a
Riemannian metric on the open orthant C ≡ Rn+1++ of V ≡ Rn+1, and assume there
exists a suﬃciently smooth strictly convex function ψ : C → R such that16
(3.14) g = Hess(ψ)2.
Then, the derivative map G : C → V , x → G(x) ≡ ∇ψ(x), is (a) injective (as the
derivative of a strictly convex function); and (b) an immersion (since Hess(ψ)  0).
Assume now that the target ambient space V is endowed with the Euclidean
metric δ(eα, eβ) = δαβ ; we then claim that G : (C, g) → (V, δ) is an isometry, i.e.,
(3.15) g(eα, eβ) = δ(G∗eα, G∗eβ) for all α, β = 0, 1, . . . , n,
where G∗eα denotes the push-forward of eα under G,
(3.16) G∗eα =
n∑
γ=0
∂Gγ
∂xα
eγ =
n∑
γ=0
∂2ψ
∂xα∂xγ
eγ , α = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Indeed, substituting (3.16) in (3.15) yields
δ(G∗eα, G∗eβ) =
n∑
γ,κ=0
∂2ψ
∂xα∂xγ
∂2ψ
∂xβ∂xκ
δ(eγ , eκ) =
n∑
γ=0
∂2ψ
∂xα∂xγ
∂2ψ
∂xβ∂xγ
= Hess(ψ)2αβ = gαβ,(3.17)
so we have established the following result.
Proposition 3.4. Let g be a Riemannian metric on the positive open orthant C
of V = Rn+1. If g = Hess(ψ)2 for some smooth function ψ : C → R, the derivative
map G = ∇ψ is an isometric injective immersion of (C, g) in (V, δ).
As it turns out, in the context of HR metrics generated by a kernel function θ,
G is actually an isometric embedding of (C, g) in (V, δ), and it can be calculated by a
simple, explicit recipe.17 To do so, let φ : (0,+∞)→ R be deﬁned as
(3.18) φ′′(x) =
√
θ′′(x),
16We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this synthetic approach.
17Recall that an embedding is an injective immersion that is homeomorphic onto its image [23].
The existence of isometric embeddings is a consequence of the celebrated Nash–Kuiper embedding
theorem; however, Nash–Kuiper does not provide an explicit construction of such an embedding.
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and consider the coordinate transformation
(EC) xα → ξα = φ′(xα), α = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Letting ψ(x) =
∑n
α=0 φ(xα), it follows immediately that the derivative map G = ∇ψ
of ψ is closed (i.e., it maps closed sets to closed sets), so the transformation (EC)
is a homeomorphism onto its image, and hence an isometric embedding of (C, g) in
(Rn+1, δ) by Proposition 3.4.
In view of the above, the variables ξα of (EC) will be referred to as Euclidean
coordinates for (C, g). In these coordinates, the image of X ◦ is the n-dimensional
hypersurface
(3.19) S = G(X ◦) =
{
ξ ∈ Rn+1 :
n∑
α=0
(φ′)−1(ξα) = 1
}
,
so (ID) can be seen equivalently as a classical mechanical system evolving on S.
Speciﬁcally, (EC) yields ξ˙α = φ
′′(xα)x˙α =
√
θ′′αx˙α and ξ¨α = θ
′′′
α
/
(2
√
θ′′α)x˙
2
α+
√
θ′′αx¨α,
so, after some algebra, we obtain the following expression for the inertial dynamics
(ID) in Euclidean coordinates:
(ID-E) ξ¨α =
1√
θ′′α
[
vα −Θ′′
∑
β
vβ
θ′′β
]
+
1
2
Θ′′√
θ′′α
∑
β
θ′′′β
(θ′′β)2
ξ˙2β − ηξ˙α.
In this way, (ID-E) represents a classical heavy ball moving on the hypersurface S
under the potential ﬁeld Φ: the ﬁrst term of (ID-E) is simply the projection of the
driving force F = gradΦ on S, the second term is the so-called contact force which
keeps the particle on S, and the third term of (ID-E) is simply the friction.
This reformulation of (ID) will play an important part in our well-posedness
analysis, so we discuss two representative examples.
Example 3.1. In the case of the Shahshahani metric (2.5), the transformation
(3.18) gives φ′′(x) =
√
θ′′(x) = 1/
√
x, so the Euclidean coordinates of the Shahsha-
hani metric are ξα = 2
√
xα, and X ◦ is isometric to the hypersurface
(3.20) S =
{
ξ ∈ Rn+1 : ξα > 0,
n∑
α=0
ξ2α = 4
}
,
which is simply the (open) positive orthant of an n-dimensional sphere of radius 2.18
Hence, substituting in (ID-E), the Euclidean equivalent of the dynamics (IRD) will
be given by
(3.21) ξ¨α =
1
2
ξα
⎡
⎣vα − 1
4
∑
β
ξ2βvβ
⎤
⎦− 1
2
ξαK − ηξ˙α,
where K = 12
∑
β ξ˙
2
β represents the system’s kinetic energy.
Example 3.2. In the case of the log-barrier metric (2.6), we have φ′′(x) = 1/x,
so the metric’s Euclidean coordinates are given by the transformation ξα = φ
′(xα) =
18This change of variables was ﬁrst considered by Akin [1] and is sometimes referred to as Akin’s
transformation [41].
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log xα. Under this transformation, X ◦ is mapped isometrically to the hypersurface
(3.22) S =
⎧⎨
⎩ξ ∈ Rn+1 : ξα < 0,
∑
β
eξβ = 1
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
which is a closed (noncompact) hypersurface of Rn+1. In these transformed variables,
the log-barrier dynamics (ILD) then become
(3.23) ξ¨α = e
ξα
⎡
⎣vα − r−2∑
β
e2ξβvβ
⎤
⎦− r−2eξα ∑
β
eξβ ξ˙2β − ηξ˙α,
where r2 =
∑
β x
2
β =
∑
β e
2ξβ .
The above examples highlight an important geometric diﬀerence between the
dynamics (IRD) and (ILD): (IRD) corresponds to a classical particle moving under
the inﬂuence of a ﬁnite force on an open portion of a sphere, while (ILD) corresponds
to a classical particle moving under the inﬂuence of a ﬁnite force on the unbounded
hypersurface (3.22). As a result, physical intuition suggests that trajectories of (IRD)
escape in ﬁnite time, while trajectories of (ILD) exist for all time (cf. Figure 1).
The following theorem (proved in Appendix B) shows that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 3.5. Let g be an HR metric on the open orthant C = Rn+1++ , and let
S be the image of X ◦ under the Euclidean transformation (EC). Then, the inertial
dynamics (ID) are well-posed on X ◦ if and only if S is a closed hypersurface of Rn+1.
From a more practical viewpoint, Theorem 3.5 allows us to verify that (ID) is
well-posed simply by checking that the Euclidean image S of X ◦ is closed. More
precisely, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.6. The inertial dynamics (ID) are well-posed if and only if the
kernel θ of the HR structure of X satisﬁes ∫ 1
0
√
θ′′(x) dx = +∞.
Proof. Simply note that the image S = G(X ◦) of X ◦ under (EC) is bounded (and
hence, not closed) if and only if
∫ 1
0 φ
′′(x) dx =
∫ 1
0
√
θ′′(x) dx < +∞.
In light of the above, we ﬁnally obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7. The inertial log-barrier dynamics (ILD) are well-posed.
4. Long-term optimization and rationality properties. In this section,
we investigate the long-term optimization and rationality properties of the inertial
dynamics (ID). Speciﬁcally, section 4.1 focuses on the single-agent framework of
(ID) with v = ∇Φ for some smooth (but not necessarily concave) objective function
Φ: X → R; section 4.2 then examines the convergence properties of (ID) in the
context of games in normal form (both symmetric and asymmetric).
Since we are interested in the long-term convergence properties of (ID), we will
assume the following throughout this section:
(WP) The solution orbits x(t) of the inertial dynamics (ID) exist for all time.
Thus, in what follows (and unless explicitly stated otherwise), we will be implicitly
assuming that the conditions of Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.6 hold; as such, the
analysis of this section applies to the inertial log-barrier dynamics (ILD) but not to
the inertial replicator system (IRD), which fails to be well-posed.
4.1. Convergence and stability properties in constrained optimization.
As before, let X ≡ Δ(n + 1) be the n-dimensional simplex of V ≡ Rn+1, and let
Φ: X → R be a smooth objective function on X . Proposition 3.1 shows that theD
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(a) The inertial replicator dynamics (IRD). (b) Euclidean equivalent of (IRD).
(c) The inertial log-barrier dynamics (ILD). (d) Euclidean equivalent of (ILD).
Fig. 1. Asymptotic behavior of the inertial dynamics (ID) and their Euclidean presentation
(ID-E) for the Shahshahani metric gS (top) and the log-barrier metric gL (bottom); cf. (2.5) and
(2.6), respectively. The surfaces to the right depict the isometric image (3.19) of the simplex in
R
n+1, and the contours represent the level sets of the objective function Φ: R3 → R with Φ(x, y, z) =
1 − (x − 2/3)2 − (y − 1/3)2 − z2. As can be seen in (a) and (b), the inertial replicator dynamics
(IRD) collide with the boundary bd(X ) of X in ﬁnite time and thus fail to maximize Φ; on the other
hand, the solution orbits of (ILD) converge globally to the global maximum point of Φ.
system’s energy is dissipated along (ID), so physical intuition suggests that interior
trajectories of (ID) are attracted to (local) maximizers of Φ. We begin by showing
that if an orbit spends an arbitrarily long amount of time in the vicinity of some point
x∗ ∈ X , then x∗ must be a critical point of Φ restricted to the face X ∗ of X that is
spanned by supp(x∗).
Proposition 4.1. Let x(t) be an interior solution of (ID) that is deﬁned for all
t ≥ 0. Assume further that, for every δ > 0 and for every T > 0, there exists an
interval J of length at least T such that maxα{|xα(t)− x∗α|} < δ for all t ∈ J . Then
(4.1) ∂αΦ(x
∗) = ∂βΦ(x∗) for all α, β ∈ supp(x∗).
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For the proof of this proposition, we will need the following preparatory lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let ξ : [a, b] → R be a smooth curve in R such that
(4.2) ξ¨ + ηξ ≤ −m
for some η ≥ 0, m > 0 and for all t ∈ [a, b]. Then, for all t ∈ [a, b], we have
(4.3) ξ(t) ≤ ξ(a) +
⎧⎨
⎩
η−1
(
ξ˙(a) +mη−1
) (
1− e−η(t−a))−mη−1(t− a) if η > 0,
ξ˙(a)(t− a)− 12m(t− a)2 if η = 0.
Proof. The case η = 0 is trivial to dispatch simply by integrating (4.2) twice.
On the other hand, for η > 0, if we multiply both sides of (4.2) with exp(ηt) and
integrate, we get
(4.4) ξ˙(t) ≤ ξ˙(a)e−η(t−a) −mη−1
(
1− e−η(t−a)
)
,
and our assertion follows by integrating a second time.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Set vβ = ∂βΦ, β = 0, . . . , n, and let α be such that
vα(x
∗) ≤ vβ(x∗) for all β ∈ supp(x∗); assume further that vα(x∗) = vγ(x∗) for some
γ ∈ supp(x∗). We then have vα(x∗)−
∑
β∈supp(x∗)Θ
′′(x∗)/θ′′β(x
∗) · vβ(x∗) < −m′ < 0
for some m′ > 0, and hence, by continuity, there exists some m > 0 such that
(4.5) θ′′α(x)
−1/2
⎛
⎝vα(x) −∑
β
(
Θ′′(x)
/
θ′′β(x)
)
vβ(x)
⎞
⎠ < m < 0
for all x ∈ Uδ ≡ {x : maxβ |xβ − x∗β | < δ} and for all suﬃciently small δ > 0 (simply
recall that limx→0+ θ′′(x) = +∞ and that θ′′α(x∗) > 0).
That being so, ﬁx δ > 0 as above, and let M > 0 be such that xα − x∗α < −δ
whenever the Euclidean coordinates ξα of (EC) satisfy ξα < −M . Choose also some
suﬃciently large T > 0; then, by assumption, there exists an interval J = [a, b] with
length b − a ≥ T and such that x(t) ∈ Uδ for all t ∈ J . Since limt→∞ x˙α(t) = 0 by
Proposition 3.2, we may also assume that the interval J = [a, b] is such that ξ˙α(a) is
itself suﬃciently small (simply note that if xα is bounded away from 0, ξ˙α = φ
′′(xα)x˙α
cannot become arbitrarily large).
In this manner, the Euclidean presentation (ID-E) of (ID) yields
(4.6) ξ¨α ≤ −m+ 1
2
Θ′′√
θ′′α
∑
β
θ′′′β
(θ′′β)2
ξ˙2β − ηξ˙α < −m− ηξ˙α for all t ∈ J,
where the second inequality follows from the regularity assumption θ′′′(x) < 0. How-
ever, with T large enough and ξ˙α(a) small enough, Lemma 4.2 shows that ξα(t) < −M
for large enough t ∈ J , implying that x(t) = Uδ, a contradiction. We thus conclude
that vα(x
∗) = vγ(x∗) for all α, γ ∈ supp(x∗), as claimed.
Proposition 4.1 shows that if x(t) converges to x∗ ∈ X , then x∗ must be a re-
stricted critical point of Φ in the sense of (4.1). More generally, the following lemma
establishes that any ω-limit of (ID) has this property.
Lemma 4.3. Let xω be an ω-limit of (ID) for η > 0, and let U be a neighborhood
of xω in X . Then, for every T > 0, there exists an interval J of length at least T
such that x(t) ∈ U for all t ∈ J .
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Proof. Fix a neighborhood U of xω in X , and let Uδ = {x : maxβ |xβ − x∗β | < δ}
be a δ-neighborhood of xω such that Uδ ∩ X ⊆ U . By assumption, there exists
an increasing sequence of times tn → ∞ such that x(tn) → xω, so we can take
x(tn) ∈ Uδ/2 for all n. Moreover, let t′n = inf{t : t ≥ tn and x(t) /∈ Uδ} be the ﬁrst
exit time of x(t) from Uδ after tn, and assume ad absurdum that t
′
n − tn < M for
some M > 0 and for all n. Then, by descending to a subsequence of tn if necessary,
we will have |xα(t′n)− xα(tn)| > δ/2 for some α and for all n. Hence, by the mean
value theorem, there exists τn ∈ (tn, t′n) such that
(4.7) |x˙α(τn)| = |xα(t
′
n)− xα(tn)|
t′n − tn
>
δ
2M
for all n,
implying in particular that lim sup |x˙α(t)| > δ/(2M) > 0 in contradiction to Propo-
sition 3.2. We thus conclude that the diﬀerence t′n − tn is unbounded; i.e., for every
δ > 0 and for every T > 0, there exists an interval J of length at least T such that
x(t) ∈ Uδ for all t ∈ J .
Even though the above properties of (ID) are interesting in themselves (cf. Theo-
rem 4.6 for a game-theoretic interpretation), for now they will mostly serve as stepping
stones to the following asymptotic convergence result.
Theorem 4.4. With notation as above, let x∗ ∈ X be a local maximizer of Φ such
that (x−x∗)
 ·Hess(Φ(x∗)) ·(x−x∗) > 0 for all x ∈ X with supp(x) ⊆ supp(x∗)—i.e.,
Hess(Φ(x∗)) is positive-deﬁnite when restricted to the face of X that is spanned by x∗.
If η > 0, then, for every interior solution x(t) of (ID) that starts close enough to x∗
and with suﬃciently low speed ‖x˙(0)‖, we have limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
Proof. Let xω be an ω-limit of x(t). By Lemma 4.3, x(t) will be spending
arbitrarily long time intervals near xω , so Proposition 4.1 shows that xω satisﬁes the
stationarity condition (4.1), viz., ∂αΦ(x
ω) = ∂βΦ(x
ω) = v∗ for all α, β ∈ supp(xω).
We will proceed to show that the theorem’s assumptions imply that x∗ is the
unique ω-limit of x(t), i.e., limt→∞ x(t) = x∗. To that end, assume that x(t) starts
close enough to x∗ and with suﬃciently low energy. Then, Proposition 3.1 shows that
every ω-limit of x(t) must also lie close enough to x∗ (simply note that Φ(x(t)) can
never exceed the initial energy E(0) of x(t)); as a result, the support of any ω-limit of
x(t) will contain that of x∗. However, by the theorem’s assumptions, the restriction
of Φ to the face of X spanned by x∗ is strongly concave near x∗, and since xω itself
lies close enough to x∗, we get
(4.8)
n∑
β=0
∂βΦ(x
ω) · (xωβ − x∗β) ≤ Φ(xω)− Φ(x∗) ≤ 0,
with equality if and only if xω = x∗. On the other hand, with supp(x∗) ⊆ supp(xω),
we also get
n∑
β=0
∂βΦ(x
ω) · (x∗β − xωβ ) =
∑
β∈supp(xω)
∂βΦ(x
ω) · (x∗β − xωβ )
= v∗
∑
β∈supp(xω)
(x∗β − xωβ ) = 0,(4.9)
so xω = x∗, as claimed.
Remark 4.1. Since the total energy E(t) of the system is decreasing, Theorem 4.4
implies that x(t) stays close and converges to x∗ whenever it starts close to x∗ with
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low energy. This formulation is almost equivalent to x∗ being asymptotically stable
in (ID); in fact, if x∗ is interior, the two statements are indeed equivalent. For
x∗ ∈ bd(X ), asymptotic stability is a rather cumbersome notion because the structure
of the phase space of the dynamics (ID) changes at every face of X ; in view of this, we
opted to stay with the simpler formulation of Theorem 4.4; for a related discussion,
see [21, sect. 5].
Remark 4.2. We should also note here that the nondegeneracy requirement of
Theorem 4.4 can be relaxed: for instance, the same proof applies if there is no x′
near x∗ such that ∂αΦ(x′) = ∂βΦ(x′) for all α, β ∈ supp(x′). More generally, if X ∗ is
a convex set of local maximizers of Φ and (4.8) holds in a neighborhood of X ∗ with
equality if and only if xω ∈ X ∗, a similar (but more cumbersome) reasoning shows
that x(t) → X ∗, i.e., X ∗ is locally attracting.
Remark 4.3. Theorem 4.4 is a local convergence result and does not exploit
global properties of the objective function (such as concavity) in order to establish
global convergence results. Even though physical intuition suggests that this should
be easily possible, the mathematical analysis is quite convoluted due to the boundary
behavior of the covariant correction term of (ID) (the second term of (ID-E) which
acts as a contact force that constrains the trajectories of (ID-E) to S).
The main diﬃculty is that a Lyapunov-type argument relying on the minimization
of the system’s total energy E = K − Φ does not suﬃce to exclude convergence to
a point xω ∈ X that is a local maximizer of Φ on the face of X that is spanned by
supp(xω). In the ﬁrst-order case, this phenomenon is ruled out by using the Bregman
divergence Dh(x
∗, x) = h(x∗) − h(x) − h′(x;x∗ − x) as a global Lyapunov function;
in our context, however, the obvious candidate Eh = K + Dh does not satisfy a
dissipation principle because of the curvature of X under the HR metric induced
by h.
4.2. Convergence and stability properties in games. We now return to
game theory and examine the convergence and stability properties of (ID) with respect
to Nash equilibria. To that end, recall ﬁrst that a strategy proﬁle x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈
X is called a Nash equilibrium if it is stable against unilateral deviations, i.e.,
(4.10) uk(x
∗) ≥ uk(xk;x∗−k) for all xk ∈ Xk and for all k ∈ N ,
or, equivalently,
(4.11) vkα(x
∗) ≥ vkβ(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗k) and for all β ∈ Ak, k ∈ N .
If (4.10) is strict for all xk = x∗k, k ∈ N , we say that x∗ is a strict equilibrium; ﬁnally,
if (4.10) holds for all xk ∈ Xk such that supp(xk) ⊆ supp(x∗k), we say that x∗ is a
restricted equilibrium [41].
Our ﬁrst result concerns potential games, viewed here simply as a class of (non-
convex) optimization problems deﬁned over products of simplices.
Proposition 4.5. Let G ≡ G(N ,A, u) be a potential game with potential function
Φ, and let x∗ be an isolated maximizer of Φ (and, hence, a strict equilibrium of G).
If η > 0 and x(t) is an interior solution of (ID) that starts close enough to x∗ with
suﬃciently low initial speed ‖x˙(0)‖, then x(t) stays close to x∗ for all t ≥ 0 and
limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
Proof. In the presence of a potential function Φ as in (1.6), the dynamics (ID)
become D2x/Dt2 = gradΦ − ηx˙ for x ∈ X ≡ ∏k Δ(Ak), so our claim essentially
follows as in Theorem 4.4: Propositions 3.2 and 4.1 extend trivially to the case where
X is a product of simplices, and, by multilinearity of the game’s potential, it followsD
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that there are no other stationary points of (ID) near a strict equilibrium of G (cf.
Remark 4.2). As a result, any trajectory of (ID) which starts close to a strict equilib-
rium x∗ of G and always remains in its vicinity will eventually converge to x∗; since
trajectories which start near x∗ with suﬃciently low kinetic energy K(0) have this
property, our claim follows.
On the other hand, Proposition 4.5 does not say much for general, nonpotential
games.
More generally, if the game does not admit a potential function, the most well-
known stability and convergence result is the so-called folk theorem of evolutionary
game theory [19, 20], which states that, under the replicator dynamics (RD), the
following hold:
I. A state is stationary if and only if it is a restricted equilibrium.
II. If an interior solution orbit converges, its limit is Nash.
III. If a point is Lyapunov stable, then it is also Nash.
IV. A point is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict equilibrium.
In the context of the inertial game dynamics (ID), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Let G ≡ G(N ,A, u) be a ﬁnite game, let x(t) be a solution orbit
of (ID) that exists for all time, and let x∗ ∈ X . Then the following hold:
I. x(t) = x∗ for all t ≥ 0 if and only if x∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G (i.e.,
vkα(x
∗) = max{vkβ(x∗) : x∗kβ > 0} whenever x∗kα > 0).
II. If x(0) ∈ X ◦ and limt→∞ x(t) = x∗, then x∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G.
III. If every neighborhood U of x∗ in X admits an interior orbit xU (t) such that
xU (t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0, then x∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G.
IV. If x∗ is a strict equilibrium of G and x(t) starts close enough to x∗ with suf-
ﬁciently low speed ‖x˙(0)‖, then x(t) remains close to x∗ for all t ≥ 0 and
limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
Proof of Theorem 4.6.
Part I. We begin with the stationarity of restricted Nash equilibria. Clearly,
extending the dynamics (ID) to bd(X ) in the obvious way, it suﬃces to consider
interior stationary equilibria. Accordingly, if x∗ ∈ X ◦ is Nash, we will have vkα(x∗) =
vkβ(x
∗) for all α, β ∈ Ak, and hence also vkα(x∗) =
∑k
β(Θ
′′
k/θ
′′
kβ)vkβ(x
∗) for all
α ∈ Ak. Furthermore, with θ′′α(x∗) > 0, the velocity-dependent terms of (ID) will
also vanish if x˙kα(0) = 0 for all α ∈ Ak, so the initial conditions x(0) = x∗, x˙(0) = 0
imply that x(t) = x∗ for all t ≥ 0. Conversely, if x(t) = x∗ for all time, then we also
have x˙(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and hence vkα(x∗) =
∑k
β(Θ
′′
k/θ
′′
kβ)vkβ(x
∗) for all α ∈ Ak;
i.e., x∗ is an equilibrium of G.
Parts II and III. For Part II of the theorem, note that if an interior trajectory x(t)
converges to x∗ ∈ X , then every neighborhood U of x∗ in X admits an interior orbit
xU (t) such that xU (t) stays in U for all t ≥ 0, so the claim of Part II is subsumed
in that of Part III. To that end, assume ad absurdum that x∗ has the property
described above without being a restricted equilibrium, i.e., there exists α ∈ supp(x∗k)
with vkα(x
∗) < maxβ{vkβ(x∗)}. As in the proof of Proposition 4.1,19 let U be a small
enough neighborhood of x∗ in X such that
(4.12) θ′′kα(x)
−1/2
[
vkα(x) −
∑
β
(
Θ′′k(x)
/
θ′′kβ(x)
)
vkβ(x)
]
< m < 0
19Note here that Proposition 4.1 does not apply directly because the dynamics (ID) need not be
conservative.D
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for all x ∈ U . Then, with x(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0, the Euclidean presentation (ID-E) of
the inertial dynamics (ID) readily gives
(4.13) ξ¨kα ≤ −m+ 1
2
Θ′′k√
θ′′kα
∑
β
θ′′′kβ
(θ′′kβ)2
ξ˙2kβ − ηξ˙kα < −m− ηξ˙kα for all t ≥ 0,
so, by Lemma 4.2, we obtain ξkα(t) → −∞ as t → ∞. However, the deﬁnition (EC)
of the Euclidean coordinates ξkα shows that xkα(t) → 0 if ξkα(t) → −∞, and since
x∗kα > 0 by assumption, we obtain a contradiction which establishes our original claim.
Part IV. Let x∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α∗N ) be a strict equilibrium of G (recall that only ver-
tices of X can be strict equilibria). We will show that if x(t) starts at rest (x˙(0) = 0)
and with initial Euclidean coordinates ξkμ(0), μ ∈ A∗k ≡ Ak \{α∗k}, that are suﬃ-
ciently close to their lowest possible value ξk,0 ≡ inf{φ′k(x) : x > 0},20 then x(t) → q as
t → ∞. Our proof remains essentially unchanged (albeit more tedious to write) if the
(Euclidean) norm of the initial velocity ξ˙(0) of the trajectory is bounded by some suﬃ-
ciently small constant δ > 0, so the theorem follows by recalling that ‖x˙(0)‖ = ‖ξ˙(0)‖.
Indeed, let U be a neighborhood of x∗ in X such that (4.12) holds for all x ∈ U
and for all μ ∈ A∗k ≡ Ak \{α∗k} substituted in place of α. Moreover, let U ′ = G(U)
be the image of U under the Euclidean embedding ξ = G(x) of (EC), and let τU =
inf{t : x(t) /∈ U} = inf{t : ξ(t) /∈ U ′} be the ﬁrst escape time of ξ(t) = G(x(t)) from
U ′. Assuming τU < +∞ (recall that ξ(t) is assumed to exist for all t ≥ 0), we have
xkμ(τU ) ≥ xkμ(0) and hence ξkμ(τU ) ≥ ξkμ(0) for some k ∈ N , μ ∈ A∗k; consequently,
there exists some τ ′ ∈ (0, τ ′U ) such that ξ˙kμ(τ ′) ≥ 0. By the deﬁnition of U , we also
have ξ¨kμ+ηξ˙kμ < −m < 0 for all t ∈ (0, τU ), so, with ξ˙(0) = 0, the bound (4.4) in the
proof of Lemma 4.2 readily yields ξ˙kμ(τ
′) < 0, a contradiction.21 We thus conclude
that τU = +∞, so we also get ξ¨kμ+ ηξ˙kμ < −m < 0 for all k ∈ N , μ ∈ A∗k, and for all
t ≥ 0. Lemma 4.2 then gives limt→∞ ξkμ(t) = −∞, i.e., x(t) → x∗, as claimed.
Theorem 4.6 is our main rationality result for asymmetric (multipopulation)
games, so some remarks are in order.
Remark 4.4. Performing a point-to-point comparison between the ﬁrst-order folk
theorem of [19, 20] for (RD) and Theorem 4.6 for (ID), we may note the following:
Part I of Theorem 4.6 is tantamount to the corresponding ﬁrst-order statement.
Part II diﬀers from the ﬁrst-order case in that it allows convergence to non-Nash
stationary proﬁles. For η = 0, the reason for this behavior is that if a trajectory x(t)
starts close to a restricted equilibrium x∗ with an initial velocity pointing towards x∗,
then x(t) may escape towards x∗ if there is only a vanishingly small force pushing x(t)
away from x∗. We have not been able to ﬁnd such a counterexample for η > 0, and
we conjecture that even a small amount of friction prohibits convergence to non-Nash
proﬁles.
Part III only posits the existence of a single interior trajectory that stays close to
x∗, so it is a less stringent requirement than Lyapunov stability; on the other hand,
and for the same reasons as before, this condition does not suﬃce to exclude non-Nash
stationary points of (ID).
20By the deﬁnition of the Euclidean coordinates ξkα = φ
′
k(xkα), this condition is equivalent to
x(t) starting at a small enough neighborhood of x∗.
21One simply needs to consider the escape time τ˜ from a larger neighborhood U˜ of q chosen so
that if |ξ˙kμ(0)| < δ for some suﬃciently small δ > 0, then the bound (4.4) guarantees the existence
of a nonpositive rate of change ξ˙kμ(τ0) for some τ0 < τ˜ .
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Part IV is not exactly the same as the corresponding ﬁrst-order statement because
the notion of asymptotic stability is quite cumbersome in a second-order setting.
Theorem 4.6 shows instead that if x(t) starts close to x∗ and with suﬃciently low
speed ‖x˙(0)‖ (or, equivalently, suﬃciently low kinetic energy K(0) = 12 ‖x˙(0)‖2), then
x(t) remains close to x∗ and limt→∞ x(t) = x∗. This result continues to hold when
restricting (ID) to any face X ′ of X containing x∗, so this can be seen as a form of
asymptotic stability for x∗.22
Remark 4.5. Finally, we note that Theorem 4.6 does not require a positive friction
coeﬃcient η > 0, in stark contrast to the convergence result of Theorem 4.4. The
reason for this is that convergence to strict equilibria corresponds to the Euclidean
trajectories of (ID-E) escaping towards inﬁnity, so friction is not required to ensure
convergence. As such, Part IV of Theorem 4.6 also extends Proposition 4.5 to the
frictionless case η = 0.
We close this section with a brief discussion of the rationality properties of (ID)
in the class of symmetric (single-population) games, i.e., 2-player games where A1 =
A2 = A for some ﬁnite set A and x1 = x2 [19, 41, 50].23 In this case, a fundamental
equilibrium reﬁnement due to Maynard Smith and Price [25, 26] is the notion of
an evolutionarily stable state (ESS), i.e., a state that cannot be invaded by a small
population of mutants; formally, we say that x∗ ∈ X ≡ Δ(A) is evolutionarily stable
if there exists a neighborhood U of x∗ in X such that
u(x∗, x∗) ≥ u(x, x∗) for all x ∈ X ,(4.14a)
u(x∗, x∗) = u(x, x∗) implies that u(x∗, x) > u(x, x),(4.14b)
where u(x, y) = x
Uy is the game’s payoﬀ function and U = (Uαβ)α,β∈A is the game’s
payoﬀ matrix.24 We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7. With notation as above, let x∗ be an ESS of a symmetric game
with symmetric payoﬀ matrix. Then, provided that η > 0, x∗ attracts all interior
trajectories of (ID) that start near x∗ and with suﬃciently low speed ‖x˙(0)‖.
Proof. Following [46], recall that x∗ is an ESS if and only if there exists a neigh-
borhood U of x∗ in X such that
(4.15) 〈v(x)|x− x∗〉 < 0 for all x ∈ U \{x∗},
where vα(x) = u(α, x) denotes the average payoﬀ of the αth strategy in x ∈ X . Since
the game’s payoﬀ matrix is symmetric, we will also have v(x) = 12∇u(x, x), so x∗ is a
local maximizer of u; as a result, the conditions of Theorem 4.4 are satisﬁed, and our
claim follows.
5. Discussion. To summarize, the class of inertial game dynamics considered in
this paper exhibits some unexpected properties. First and foremost, in the case of the
replicator dynamics, the inertial system (IRD) does not coincide with the second-order
replicator dynamics of exponential learning (RD2); in fact, the dynamics (IRD) are not
even well-posed, so the rationality properties of (RD2) do not hold in that case. On
22This could be formalized by considering the phase space obtained by joining the phase space
of (ID) with that of every possible restriction of (ID) to a face X ′ of X , but this is a rather tedious
formulation (see also the relevant remark following Theorem 4.4).
23In the mass-action interpretation of evolutionary game theory, this class of games simply corre-
sponds to intraspecies interactions in a single-species population [50].
24Intuitively, (4.14a) implies that x∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game, while (4.14b)
means that x∗ performs better against any alternative best reply x than x performs against itself.
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the other hand, by considering a diﬀerent geometry on the simplex, we obtain a well-
posed class of game dynamics with several local convergence and stability properties,
some of which do not hold for (RD2) (such as the asymptotic stability of ESSs in
symmetric, single-population games).
Having said that, we still have several open questions concerning the dynamics’
global properties. From an optimization viewpoint, the main question that remains is
whether the dynamics converge globally to a maximum point in the case of concave
functions; in a game-theoretic framework, the main issue is the elimination of strictly
dominated strategies (which is true in both (RD) and (RD2)) and, more interestingly,
that of weakly dominated strategies (which holds under (RD2) but not under (RD)).
A positive answer to these questions (which we expect is the case) would imply that
the class of inertial game dynamics combines the advantages of both ﬁrst- and second-
order learning schemes in games, thus providing a common umbrella for a wide array
of long-term rationality properties.
Appendix A. Elements of Riemannian geometry. In this section, we give
a brief overview of the geometric notions used in the main part of the paper following
the masterful account of [22].
Let W = Rn+1, and let W ∗ be its dual. A scalar product on W is a bilinear
pairing 〈·, ·〉 : W ×W → R such that for all w, z ∈ W ,
1. 〈w, z〉 = 〈z, w〉 (symmetry);
2. 〈w,w〉 ≥ 0 with equality if and only if w = 0 (positive-deﬁniteness).
By linearity, if {eα}nα=0 is a basis for W and w =
∑n
α=0 wαeα, z =
∑n
β=0 zβeβ , we
have
(A.1) 〈w, z〉 =
n∑
α,β=0
gαβwαzβ ,
where the so-called metric tensor gαβ of the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 is deﬁned as
(A.2) gαβ = 〈eα, eβ〉.
Likewise, the norm of w ∈ W is deﬁned as
(A.3) ‖w‖ = 〈w,w〉1/2 =
⎛
⎝ d∑
α,β=0
gαβwαwβ
⎞
⎠
1/2
.
Now, if U is an open set inW and x ∈ U , the tangent space to U at x is simply the
(pointed) vector space TxU ≡ {(x,w) : w ∈ W} ∼= W of tangent vectors at x; dually,
the cotangent space to U at x is the dual space T ∗xU ≡ (TxU)∗ ∼= W ∗ of all linear forms
on TxU (also known as cotangent vectors). Fibering the above constructions over U ,
a vector ﬁeld (resp., diﬀerential form) is then a smooth assignment x → w(x) ∈ TxU
(resp., x → ω(x) ∈ T ∗xU), and the space of vector ﬁelds (resp., diﬀerential forms) on
U will be denoted by T (U) (resp., T ∗(U)).
Given all this, a Riemannian metric on U is a smooth assignment of a scalar
product to each tangent space TxU , i.e., a smooth ﬁeld of (symmetric) positive-deﬁnite
metric tensors gαβ(x) prescribing a scalar product between tangent vectors at each
x ∈ U . Furthermore, if f : U → R is a smooth function on U , the diﬀerential of f at
x is deﬁned as the (unique) diﬀerential form df(x) ∈ T ∗xU such that
(A.4)
d
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
f(γ(t)) = 〈df(x)|γ˙(0)〉
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for every smooth curve γ : (−ε, ε) → U with γ(0) = x. Dually, given a Riemannian
metric on U , the gradient of f at x is then deﬁned as the (unique) vector grad f(x) ∈
TxU such that
(A.5)
d
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
f(γ(t)) = 〈grad f(x), γ˙(0)〉
for all smooth curves γ(t) as above.
Combining (A.4) and (A.5), we see that df(x) and gradf(x) satisfy the funda-
mental duality relation
(A.6) 〈df(x)|w〉 = 〈grad f(x), w〉 for all w ∈ TxU .
Hence, by writing everything out in coordinates and rearranging, we obtain
(A.7) (grad f(x))α =
n∑
β=0
gαβ(x)
∂f
∂xβ
,
where
(A.8) gαβ(x) = g−1αβ (x)
denotes the inverse matrix of the metric tensor gαβ(x). For simplicity, we will often
write this equation as gradf = g−1∇f , where ∇f = (∂αf)nα=0 denotes the array of
partial derivatives of f .
In view of the above, diﬀerentiating a function f ∈ C∞(U) along a vector ﬁeld
w ∈ T (U) simply amounts to taking the directional derivative w(f) ≡ 〈df |w〉 =
〈grad f, w〉. On the other hand, to diﬀerentiate a vector ﬁeld along another vector
ﬁeld, we will need the notion of a (linear) connection on U , viz., a map
(A.9) ∇ : T (U)× T (U) → T (U)
written as (w, z) → ∇wz and such that
1. ∇f1w1+f2w2z = f1∇w1z + f2∇w2z for all f1, f2 ∈ C∞(U);
2. ∇w(az1 + bz2) = a∇wz1 + b∇wz2 for all a, b ∈ R;
3. ∇w(fz) = f ·∇wz+∇wf ·z for all f ∈ C∞(U), where ∇wf ≡ w(f) = 〈df |w〉.
In this way, ∇wz generalizes the idea of diﬀerentiating z along w, and it will be called
the covariant derivative of z in the direction of w.
In the standard frame {eα}nα=0 of TU , the deﬁning properties of ∇ give
(A.10) ∇wz =
n∑
α,β=0
wα
∂zβ
∂xα
eβ +
n∑
α,β,κ=0
Γκαβwαzβeκ,
where the Christoﬀel symbols Γκαβ ∈ C∞(U) of ∇ in the frame {eα} are deﬁned via
the equation
(A.11) ∇eαeβ =
n∑
κ=0
Γκαβeκ.
Clearly, ∇ is completely speciﬁed by its Christoﬀel symbols, so there is no canonical
connection on U ; however, if U is also endowed with a Riemannian metric g, then
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INERTIAL GAME DYNAMICS 3165
there exists a unique connection which is symmetric (i.e., Γκαβ = Γ
κ
βα) and compatible
with g in the sense that
(A.12) ∇w 〈z1, z2〉 = 〈∇wz1, z2〉+ 〈z1,∇wz2〉 for all w, z1, z2 ∈ T (U).
This connection is known as the Levi–Civita connection on U , and its Christoﬀel
symbols are given in coordinates by
(A.13) Γκαβ =
1
2
n∑
ρ=0
gκρ
(
∂gρβ
∂xα
+
∂gρα
∂xβ
− ∂gαβ
∂xρ
)
.
In view of the above, the covariant derivative of a vector ﬁeld w ∈ T (U) along a
curve γ(t) on U is deﬁned as
(A.14)
Dw
Dt
≡ ∇γ˙w ≡
n∑
α,β,κ=0
(
w˙κ + Γ
κ
αβwαγ˙β
)
eκ.
Thus, specializing to the case where w(t) is simply the velocity υ(t) = γ˙(t) of γ, the
acceleration of γ is deﬁned as D
2γ
Dt2 =
Dυ
Dt = ∇γ˙ γ˙ or, in components,
(A.15)
D2γκ
Dt2
≡ γ¨κ +
n∑
α,β=0
Γκαβ γ˙αγ˙β .
The kinetic energy of a curve γ(t) is deﬁned simply as K = 12 ‖γ˙‖2; in view of the
metric compatibility condition (A.12), it is then easy to show that
(A.16) K˙ =
〈
D2γ
Dt2
, γ˙
〉
,
so a curve moves at constant speed (K˙ = 0) if and only if it satisﬁes the geodesic
equation D
2γ
Dt2 = 0. On account of the above, the deﬁnition (A.15) of a curve’s covariant
acceleration is simply a consequence of the fundamental requirement that “curves
with zero acceleration move at constant speed” (by contrast, note that γ¨ = 0 does
not necessarily imply K˙ = 0, so γ¨ cannot act as a covariant measure of acceleration).
Appendix B. Calculations and proofs. In this section, we provide some
calculations and proofs that would have otherwise disrupted the ﬂow of the paper.
B.1. Calculation of the Christoﬀel symbols. We begin with a matrix inver-
sion formula that is required for our geometric calculations.
Lemma B.1. Let Aμν = qμδμν + q0 for some q0, q1, . . . , qn > 0. Then, the inverse
matrix Aμν of Aμν is
(B.1) Aμν =
δμν
qμ
− Q
qμqν
,
where Q denotes the harmonic aggregate Q−1 ≡∑nα=0 q−1α .
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Proof. By a straightforward veriﬁcation, we have
n∑
ν=1
AμνA
νρ =
n∑
ν=1
(qμδμν + q0)(δνρ/qν −Q/(qνqρ))
=
n∑
ν=1
(qμδμνδνρ/qν + q0δνρ/qν − qμQδμν/(qνqρ)− q0Q/(qνqρ))
= δμρ + q0q
−1
ρ −Qq−1ρ − q0Qq−1ρ
∑
ν
q−1ν = δμρ,(B.2)
as claimed.
With this inversion formula at hand, the inverse matrix g˜μν of the metric tensor
g˜μν of g in the coordinates (2.8) will be given by (2.12), viz., g˜
μν =
[
δμν −Θ′′/θ′′ν
]
/θ′′μ.
Thus, the Christoﬀel symbols Γ˜κμν of g˜ in the same coordinate chart can be calculated
by the expression Γ˜κμν =
∑
ρ g˜
κρΓ˜ρμν , where, in view of (A.13), the Christoﬀel symbols
of the ﬁrst kind Γ˜ρμν are deﬁned as
(B.3) Γ˜ρμν =
1
2
(
∂g˜ρμ
∂wν
+
∂g˜ρν
∂wμ
− ∂g˜μν
∂wρ
)
.
Note now that (2.10) implies that g˜μν =
∂2h˜
∂xμ∂xν
, where h˜ = h ◦ ι0 : U → R is the
pull-back of h to U via ι0. By the equality of mixed partials, we then obtain
(B.4) Γ˜ρμν =
1
2
∂3h˜
∂wρ∂wμ∂wν
=
1
2
(
θ′′′ρ δρμν − θ′′′0
)
,
where δρμν = δρμδμν denotes the triagonal Kronecker symbol (δρμν = 1 if ρ = μ = ν
and 0 otherwise) and θ′′′β , β = 0, 1, . . . , n, is shorthand for θ
′′′
β (x) = θ
′′′(xβ). Accord-
ingly, combining (B.4) and (2.12), we ﬁnally obtain
Γ˜κμν =
n∑
ρ=1
g˜κρΓ˜ρμν =
1
2
∑
ρ
(
δκρ
θ′′ρ
− Θ
′′
θ′′ρθ′′k
)
(θ′′′ρ δρμν − θ′′′0 )
=
1
2
[
δκμν
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
− Θ
′′θ′′′μ
θ′′κθ′′μ
δμν − θ
′′′
0
θ′′κ
+
Θ′′θ′′′0
θ′′κ
(
1
Θ′′
− 1
θ′′0
)]
=
1
2
[
δκμν
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
− Θ
′′θ′′′μ
θ′′κθ′′μ
δμν − θ
′′′
0 Θ
′′
θ′′0 θ′′κ
]
,(B.5)
where we used the fact that
∑n
ρ=1 1/θ
′′
ρ = 1/Θ
′′ − 1/θ′′0 in the second line. Conse-
quently, we obtain the following expression for the covariant acceleration (A.15) of a
curve x(t) on U :
D2xκ
Dt2
= x¨κ +
1
2
n∑
μ,ν=1
[
δκμν
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
− Θ
′′θ′′′μ
θ′′κθ′′μ
δμν − θ
′′′
0 Θ
′′
θ′′0θ′′κ
]
x˙μx˙ν
= x¨κ +
1
2
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
x˙2κ −
1
2
Θ′′
θ′′κ
⎡
⎣ n∑
ν=1
θ′′′ν
θ′′ν
x˙2ν +
θ′′′0
θ′′0
(
n∑
ν=1
x˙ν
)2⎤⎦ ,(B.6)
which is simply (2.18).
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B.2. The well-posedness dichotomy. In this section, we prove our geometric
characterization for the well-posedness of (ID).
Proof of Theorem 3.5. As indicated by our discussion on the inertial systems
(IRD) and (ILD), we will prove Theorem 3.5 for the equivalent Euclidean dynamics
(ID-E); also, we will only tackle the frictionless case η = 0, the case η > 0 being
entirely similar. Finally, for notational convenience, the Euclidean inner product will
be denoted in what follows by w · z and the corresponding norm by |·|.
On account of the above, let ξ(t) be a local solution orbit of (ID-E) with initial
conditions ξ(0) ≡ ξ0 ∈ S and ξ˙(0) = ξ˙0 ∈ Tξ0S; existence and uniqueness of ξ(t)
follow from the classical Picard–Lindelo¨f theorem, so assume ad absurdum that ξ(t)
only exists up to some maximal time T > 0. Accordingly, let
Fα =
1√
θ′′α
(
vα −Θ′′
∑
β
vβ
θ′′β
)
(B.7a)
and
Nα =
Θ′′
2
√
θ′′α
∑
β
θ′′′β
(θ′′β)2
ξ˙2β(B.7b)
denote the tangential and contact force terms of (ID-E), respectively. Since F is a
weighted diﬀerence of bounded quantities, we will have |F (ξ(t))| ≤ Fmax for some
Fmax > 0; furthermore, it is easy to verify that N is indeed normal to S, so, for all
t < T , the work of the resultant force F +N along ξ(t) will be
(B.8) W (t) =
∫
ξ
(F +N) =
∫ t
0
F (ξ(s)) · ξ˙(s) ds ≤ Fmax
∫ t
0
|ξ˙(s)| ds ≤ Fmax · (t),
where (t) =
∫ t
0 |ξ˙(s)| ds is the (Euclidean) length of ξ up to time t.
On the other hand, with F +N = ξ¨, we will also have
(B.9) W (t) =
∫ t
0
ξ¨(s) · ξ˙(s) ds = 12υ2(t)− 12υ20 ,
where υ(t) = |ξ˙(t)| = ˙(t) is the speed of the trajectory at time t and υ0 ≡ |ξ˙0|.
Combining the above with (B.8), we thus get the diﬀerential inequality
(B.10) υ(t) = ˙(t) ≤
√
υ20 + 2Fmax (t),
which, after separating variables and integrating, gives
(B.11)
√
υ20 + 2Fmax (t)− υ0 ≤ Fmax t.
It thus follows that the speed υ(t) of the trajectory is bounded by |ξ˙(t)| = υ(t) ≤ υ0t+
Fmaxt; similarly, for the total distance travelled by ξ(t), we get (t) ≤ υ0t+ 12Fmaxt2,
so |ξ| and |ξ˙| are both bounded by some max and υmax, respectively, for all t ≤ T .
As a result, for any s, t ∈ [0, T ) with s < t, we will also have
(B.12) |ξ(t) − ξ(s)| ≤
∫ t
s
|ξ˙(τ)| dτ ≤ υmax(t− s),
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so, if tn → T is Cauchy, the same will hold for ξ(tn) as well; hence, with S closed, we
will also have limt→T ξ(t) ≡ ξT ∈ S. With ξ˙ bounded, we then get
(B.13) |ξ˙(t)− ξ˙(s)| ≤
∫ t
s
|ξ¨(τ)| dτ ≤ Fmax(t− s) +
∑
β
∫ t
s
|Nβ(ξ(τ), ξ˙(τ))| dτ,
and with sup |ξ| , sup|ξ˙| < ∞, it follows that the components |Nβ| of the contact force
are also bounded: x(t) = G−1(ξ(t)) remains a positive distance away from bd(X ) for
all t ≤ T , so the weight coeﬃcients θ′′′β /(θ′′β)2 of the centripetal force N in (B.7b)
are bounded, and the same holds for the velocity components ξ˙2β . We will thus have
|ξ˙(t)− ξ˙(s)| ≤ a(t− s) for some a > 0, so the limit limt→T ξ˙(t) exists and is ﬁnite. In
this way, if we take (ID-E) with initial conditions ξ(T ) = ξT and ξ˙(T ) = limt→T ξ˙(t),
the Picard–Lindelo¨f theorem shows that the original maximal solution ξ(t) may be
extended beyond the maximal integration time T , a contradiction.
For the converse implication, assume that S is not closed in the ambient space V ≡
R
n+1, let S denote its closure, and let q ∈ S \S. Clearly, S is a closed submanifold-
with-boundary of V , and the metric induced by the inclusion S ↪→ V on S will agree
with the one induced by the inclusion S ↪→ V on S. With this in mind, let γ(t) be a
geodesic of S which starts at q with initial velocity υ0 pointing towards the interior
of S, and let T > 0 be suﬃciently small so that γ(T ) = p ∈ S◦. Furthermore, let
υT = γ˙(T ) be the velocity with which γ(t) reaches p; by the invariance of the geodesic
equation with respect to time reﬂections, this means that the geodesic which starts at
p with velocity −υT will reach q at ﬁnite time T > 0 with outward-pointing velocity
−υ0. Noting that geodesics on S are simply solutions of (ID-E) for v ≡ 0 and η = 0,
and carrying (ID-E) back to X ◦ via the isometry (EC), we have shown that (ID)
admits a solution which escapes from X ◦ in ﬁnite time, i.e., (ID) is not well-posed if
S is not closed.25
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